ABSTRACT Medical cloud blends medical treatment, cloud computing, and cloud storage together via the Internet to achieve stakeholders' benefits (healthcare center, patient, doctor, and cloud server). It also enables bunch of shared computing-storage resources to end users at anytime and anywhere. Due to the complexity and openness of the Internet, assorted challenges are there. Hence, security and privacy are the dominant concerns. Therefore, a strong privacy protection authentication protocol is desired. Very recently, Cheng et al. proposed a cloud-based authentication protocol and claimed that their protocol was against mentioned weaknesses in their paper. However, the analysis shows that Cheng et al.'s protocol is insecure against message confidentiality and patient's anonymity. Then, a novel energy-efficient and traceable authentication protocol (ETAP) is proposed. The ETAP not only mitigates the weaknesses, but has other advantages. First, the ETAP realizes authentication with extremely low computational cost between stakeholders. Second, the ETAP can enable patients to enjoy the remote services with privacy protection. Finally, the ETAP is proven to be safe against passive and active attacks under the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem assumption in random oracle model. Hence, these features make the ETAP very suitable for computationlimited mobile devices (such as smartphone and PAD) compared with other related existing protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Aging is a universal phenomenon affecting all countries, although its dynamic can be different in each. According to the lasted census report, the population of the world is aging rapidly, where more than 12.3% of the world's population are over 60 years old. It is predicted that the population over 60 will exceed the population under 15 by 2050 [1] . It is widely believed that health expenditure per capita on older people is higher than that in younger age groups [2] . Meanwhile, elderly people are suffering from different chronic conditions and disabilities. Hence, using health care services will be a necessity of life. It is no doubt that the demand for medical service is increasing. However, traditional medical systems have failed to meet the growing medical needs. Therefore, it is urgent to design a secure and efficient medical system.
Medical cloud computing service is currently at its climax due to its built-in merits as it offers great processing power, abrupt manipulation of huge datas and accessibility of expensive hardware resources at a very cheap rate. In other words, easy accessibility, better performance and ability to scale have made it unbeatable in the Internet age [3] .
In mobile medical cloud architecture, the cloud users store medical records in the database to retrieve the medical report safely. Medical cloud computing server enables bunch of shared computing resources to end users at anytime and anywhere via the Internet. Hence, medical cloud computing service is emerging as an eminent facility for mobile world to experience efficient and remote computing resources and data storage.
In the said system, patients can gain the health monitoring information and access medical services at home by using mobile Internet conveniently and timely. Health practitioners can monitor their patients' health datas and send the professional advices to their patients by using their devices, remotely and conveniently. Furthermore, they can also access patients' history corresponding records from medical cloud by using their devices. It is getting increasingly popularly in moving patients from hospital ward rooms into their homes. Obviously, gaining the electronic medical service is becoming a hot topic in academia and health care industry.
Although medical cloud computing service is at its inception, some serious concerns must be encountered ahead to make it more trustworthy, stable and user-friendly. For traditional protocols, security is an important indicator. Undoubtedly, security is also the primary concern and user's privacy is also one of the nontrivial concerns in mobile medical cloud architecture [4] - [6] . In order to achieve efficiency, convenience, security and privacy of the said system, many efforts have been made.
A. RELATED WORKS
In 2009, Lin et al. [7] firstly considered these problems by proposing a strong privacy-preserving protocol for e-health systems. Subsequently, most authentication protocols have been proposed [8] - [13] . However, these were pioneer works on security-aware data transmission for e-health systems while they did not take into account the data transmission scenarios. In order to fix the flaw, Zhang et al. [14] put forward an authentication protocol for e-health systems. Based on password and smart card, Wu et al. [15] proposed a new authentication protocol for personalized e-health systems using wireless medical sensor networks. Unluckily, passwords might be divulged and forgotten. Smart cards might be shared, lost, and stolen. Later on, Zhang et al. [16] proposed a three-factor privacy protection protocol for e-health systems.
However, all schemes above are only suitable for pointto-point single-medical server environment, where patients are very inconvenient since they have to register in different medical servers to access different medical services. Later, Liu et al. [17] proposed a lightweight pseudonym authentication protocol for multi-medical server architecture in 2017. However, end users, who are both in singlesever protocols and multi-sever ones, need to store large amounts of datas. It is especially inconvenient and inefficient in e-health systems. Fortunately, mobile medical cloud computing comes into being, which is an emerging infrastructure where computation, manipulation and storage of datas take place away from mobile devices. This infrastructure itself is designated as cloud [18] , [19] , which is further illustrated in Fig. 1 .
In 2014, Chen et al. [20] combined the cloud computing with e-health services to provide medical resources, which claimed it was secure against many common attacks. However, the protocol was pointed out that it could not ensure patient's anonymity and message authentication [21] . Later [22] , [23] found out that the protocol in [21] failed to provide patient's anonymity and message confidentiality. It also suffered from KCI attack. [24] found that the protocol [22] failed to protect patient anonymity and unlinkability. Unfortunately, through careful analysis, we find that the protocols [22] - [24] still suffers from security threats. In [22] and [24] , each valid users can easily obtain the cloud server's private key. It is no doubt to increase secure risk of the system. For [23] , it still cannot ensure patient's anonymity and message confidentiality.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In order to fix the flaws, a novel traceable authentication protocol (ETAP, for short) in mobile medical cloud architecture is proposed in this paper. Compared with [21] - [24] , the ETAP not only needs lower computational consumption, but also can provide the following security features:
• First, the ETAP not only can provide patient's anonymity to protect patient's privacy by randomized pseudonyms PNID P1 and PNID P2 , but also when a patient P sends the false messages to deceive doctors, healthcare center H can obtain P's static pseudonym NID P from PNID P1 and PNID P2 . Then, H can extract P's real identity by decrypting NID P using his/her private key. Besides, the other participants in the said system cannot obtain the patients' real identities. Hence, the ETAP is practical in the privacy-enhanced scenarios.
• Second, the ETAP can truly realize mutual authentication, which is achieved between healthcare center and cloud server, patients and cloud server, and doctors and cloud server to strength the security of a system and transmitting information. What's more, the entire process costs low computation, low communication cost and low energy. Hence, the ETAP is very efficient and energy-saving and it is very suitable for computation-limited mobile devices.
• Third, the ETAP is proved to be safe under the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) assumption in the random oracle model. The ETAP is proved to be safe against possible known attacks and it meets the secure requirements of authentication protocols for heterogeneous cloud architecture. Hence, the ETAP is practical in complex mobile medical cloud architecture.
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews Cheng et al.'s protocol and its weaknesses are analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the ETAP. Detailed security analysis and proof are given in section 5. The performance comparisons between ETAP with other related protocols are shown in section 6. Section 7 concludes this paper.
II. REVIEW OF CHENG et al.'s PROTOCOL
Cheng et al.'s [23] protocol is composed of Healthcare center authentication phase, Patient authentication phase, Treatment phase and Checking report phase. To simplify the subsequent description, some notations are given in Table 1 . Cheng et al.'s protocol is briefly reviewed as follows.
A. HEALTHCARE CENTER AUTHENTICATION PHASE
When a patient P goes to a healthcare center H to acquire medical service by his/her mobile device, H allocates a dynamic pseudo-random identity NID P . In addition, H generates and sends the medical report as m H = (ID H , Data H , T 1 H ) to the cloud server C. The details of this phase are described below:
Step1 After generating the medical report m H = (ID H , Data H , T 1 H ), H uses his/her private key 
C. TREATMENT PHASE
Doctor D performs the treatment of P by performing mutual authentication between D and C. After that, D obtains P's identity ID P and the appointment sequence number sn from C. After diagnosing P's symptom, D uploads diagnostic records to C. The details of this phase are described below: Step1 D randomly chooses a session key key DC and an extemporaneous private key r D , computes epk D = r D Q ∈ R G key as an extemporaneous public key,
Upon receiving msg6, C reads the current time T 3 C and checks 
. If the signature is valid, P receives treatment report m D . After that, P uses the pre-generated key to compute
If it does not match, C returns to Step1. Otherwise, C replaces C 5 with C 4 .
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF CHENG et al.'s PROTOCOL
In this section, we will show that Cheng et al.'s protocol fails to Anonymity. Moreover, Cheng et al.'s protocol cannot provide the Message Confidentiality. The adversary model of cloud authentication protocol [25] , [26] is that the adversary A can eavesdrop, intercept, delete, and modify all messages from the public communication channel.
A. FAILS TO SUPPORT PATIENT's ANONYMITY
Anonymity degree is an important aspect to measure the performance of an anonymity medical cloud environment system. Cheng et al. claimed that their protocol was born with the good anonymity by using dynamic pseudo-random NID P to protect the privacy. However, the analysis shows that it is not true. A can obtain all messages from the public communication channel. So A can get msg8 = {sn, Sig D , C 4 , S 11 } and msg10 = {S 14 
. Hence, A is too easy to get P's real identity ID P . Hence, the protocol fails to support patient's anonymity.
B. FAILS TO PROVIDE MESSAGE CONFIDENTIALITY
According to previous analysis, A can obtain the treatment information m D easily. A not only obtains msg8 and msg10, but also gets msg4 = {S 6 
A. PATIENT REGISTRATION PHASE
If a patient P wants to access medical services in the cloud system, he/she should register in healthcare center H firstly. The steps and the detailed interactive processes between P and H are shown in Fig.2 . Step1 P chooses his/her ID P . Then, P ⇒ H: ID P ; Step2 Upon receiving the registration message from P, H selects a random value ξ P ∈ Z * q , computes NID P = E SK H (ID P , ξ P ), and stores NID P in his/her database. Then, H → P: NID P ; 
B. HEALTHCARE CENTER UPLOAD PHASE
In this phase, the patient P goes to healthcare center H to acquire medical service. H generates the medical report
, processes a mutual authentication with C and uploads the medical report to C. The operations illustrated in Fig.3 are explained as follows: 
If it does not match, H returns to Step1. Otherwise, H ends this phase and renews the stored datas.
C. PATIENT AUTHENTICATION PHASE
Body sensor (in/on P's body) can measure P's health datas m B = (ID P , Data B , T 1 P ). P can obtain the datas via his/her mobile device (such as mobile phone, iPad) securely, download the report m H from C, make an appointment with D to get an appointment sequence number sn and upload encrypted m H and m B to C . The details of this phase are shown in Fig.4 and described below:
Step1 After obtaining the medical report m B = (ID P , Data B , T 1 P ) from body sensor, P randomly chooses a session key key PC1 , computes
Upon receiving msg3, C reads the current time T 2 C and checks
If that above verification does not hold, the upload request is rejected. Otherwise, C computes key PC1 = S 5 ⊕ h 1 (e(PK P + epk P , SK C + r C ), T 1 P ) and checks S 6 ? = h(key PC1 ). If it does not hold, terminates it. Otherwise, C computes NID P = PNID P1 ⊕ h 2 (key PC1 , S 5 ) and checks the pair (NID P , S 5 ) ∈ database according to NID P . If it does not hold, terminates it. Otherwise, C replaces the S old 5 with S 5 , stores the pair (NID P , S 5 ) in database. Meanwhile, the pair (NID P , S 5 ) will be changed according to P's upload. C obtains the stored datas C 1 and S 1 according to NID P . C computes
Step3 On receiving msg4, P checks S 7 ? = h 2 (key PC1 , C 1 , S 1 ). If it does not match, terminates it. Otherwise,
, and replaces the pair (C 1 , S 1 ) with the pair (C 3 , S 8 ). Step1 D randomly chooses a session key key DC , computes
and
If the value is valid, D makes a medical diagnosis based on the medical report, generates corresponding medical report Step4 Upon receiving msg8, C checks S 14 ? = h 2 (key DC , C 4 , S 13 ). If it does not match, terminates it. Otherwise, C replaces the pair (C 3 , S 8 ) with the pair (C 4 , S 13 ).
E. CHECKING UP PHASE
After performing treatment from a doctor D, the patient P's report is stored in the cloud. P can know his/her state of an illness by downloading the medical report and obtains much better treatment based on the report. The details of this phase are shown in Fig.6 and described below:
Step1 P randomly chooses a session key key PC2 , computes S 15 = h 1 (e(PK C + epk C , SK P + r P ), T 2 P ) ⊕ key PC2 , PNID P2 = h 2 (key PC2 , S 15 ) ⊕ NID P , and 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PROOF OF ETAP
In this section, we will analyze the security of the ETAP under the same adversary model mentioned above.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The main four phases share the same authentication method. For simplification, we only consider the one phase (Healthcare center upload phase) as a sample.
1) CORRECTNESS OF MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
In Healthcare center upload phase, all the authentication messages (S 2 , S 3 , S 4 ) are based on bilinear pair e(PK C +epk C , SK H +r H ) (e(PK H +epk H , SK C +r C )), where
, which is only shared between H and C, and anyone cannot obtain it except H and C. In the whole phase as shown in Fig3, H authenticates C, and C authenticates H. In the end, they share a session key key HC . Hence, the ETAP achieves mutual authentication.
2) MESSAGE CONFIDENTIALITY
In ETAP, one hand, the messages (m H , m B , m D ) are involved in (C 1 , S 1 , C 2 , S 8 , C 3 , C 4 , S 13 ). These messages are not only encrypted by the secret values key, key HC , key PC1 , key PC2 and key DC , which are unknown to A, but also protected by onewayness hash function. On the other hand, considering the needs of all interested parties including H, P and D, the each self-interest is closely linked with the common good. Hence, they are trustworthy to each other. The messages m H , m B and m D are encrypted by key = h 1 (e(PK P + epk P , PK D + epk D ) SK H +r H , NID P ), which is only shared between H, P and D, and anyone cannot obtain it except H, P and D. Hence, the ETAP achieves data confidentiality.
3) KEY COMPROMISE IMPERSONATION (KCI) ATTACK
Suppose that H's secret key SK H is leaked out by accident or intentionally stolen by A. A chooses a random value key AC , A can easily impersonate H to deceive C by using H's secret key SK H . However, A cannot fool H successfully without knowing the real session key key HC . Hence, the ETAP can resist KCI attack.
4) PATIENT ANONYMITY
The ETAP adopts the anonymous blind identities PNID P1 = h 2 (key PC1 , S 5 ) ⊕ NID P and PNID P2 = h 2 (key PC2 , S 15 ) ⊕ NID P instead of the real static identity ID P in the public communication channel. Meanwhile, they are differen in each run. Here, NID P = E SK H (ID P , ξ P ). By using a secure cryptographic symmetric encryption, the malicious adversary A cannot extract the ID P without knowing SK H , which is required to successfully decrypt the ciphertext. Further, in the ETAP, the cloud server C cannot know the P's real identity either. In this way, the ETAP provides patient's anonymity, which can prevent the privacy leakage of patient's identity.
5) PATIENT TRACEABILITY
If a patient P sends some false messages to deceive the cloud server C, H can extract P's real identity by decrypting NID P using his/her private key SK H . Hence, the ETAP achieves patient traceability to prevent malicious patients from doing something to harm systems.
6) KNOW-KEY ATTACK
In the ETAP, key HC is the session key shared between H and C, wherein key HC is random values chosen by H, which is different in each session run. key HC is protected by hash function which cannot disclose any information. Therefore, A cannot infer any valuable information from the forward and backward session keys, even if he/she gets the current session key. So, even if some previous session keys have been leaked, the security of the current session key in the ETAP needs not to be worried.
7) IMPERSONATION ATTACK
If A can obtain the information msg1 = {ID H , S 2 , S 3 , C 2 , epk H , T 1 H }, msg2 = {S 4 } in public channel. A (other malicious-legitimate healthcare centers) cannot get the secret information key HC only shared between H and C. So A can not figure out the valid authentication messages S 3 = h 2 (key HC ) and S 4 = h 2 (key HC + 1) to pass the authentication. Hence, the ETAP can resist the impersonation attack.
8) INTERNAL ATTACKS
Assume that A is a malicious-legitimate healthcare center, A uses his/her own information in public channel. He/She obtains nothing about other center's random values key HC . So he/she cannot succeed in forging authentication information S 3 = h 2 (key HC ) and S 4 = h 2 (key HC + 1) to pass the authentication. Hence, the ETAP can resist the internal attacks.
9) REPLAY ATTACK
Suppose A intercepts the massage msg1, where S 2 = h 1 (SK H + r H , PK C + epk C , T 1 H ) ⊕ key HC , and replies this message to C. However, C stores the pair (ID H , S 2 ) in its database. Later, when C receives the next upload request message msg1, C compares S 2 corresponding to ID H . If it matches, C ensures that this request message is a replay message and rejects this request. Or else, C replaces S old 2 with S 2 . Hence, the ETAP can resist the replay attack.
10) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
In this attack, A may try to impersonate a valid healthcare center H, or his/her partner C by intercepting the message. However, in the ETAP, the secret value key HC is only shared between H and C, it will never be discovered by anybody else except H and C. Hence, the ETAP is secure against man-inthe-middle attack.
B. SECURITY PROOF 1) SECURITY MODEL AND NOTATIONS
Firstly, the formal security model for authentication protocols is described, which is mainly developed from VOLUME 6, 2018
Bellare et al. [27] . On the basis of [28] , [29] , a security proof of ETAP is given under the hardness assumption of the ECDLP.
• Participants and initialization
In an authentication protocol, participants are divided into two parts: clients (healthcare center H, patient P, doctor D) (Here, the clients share the same authentication method, so we treat them as a whole: W ∈ Clients and Server (cloud server C ∈ Server). Each participants is modeled as a set of random oracles. Each oracles not only can be independent, but also can be executed concurrently. Each participants holds a public/ private key pair (SK k , PK k ) (k = W, C), where
• Execution of the protocol S is a simulator, who simulates the protocol for A. The interactions between S and A occur only via oracle queries, which simulate the adversary's capabilities in a real attack. All possible oracle queries are listed in the following: Execute(W, C) This oracle query is used to simulate A's passive eavesdropping attack. Its output consists of the messages that were exchanged between W and C during the real execution of the protocol. • Corrupt(W, a) If a = 1, it outputs the W's private key; If a = 2, it outputs W's extemporaneous private key.
Send(W/C, m) This oracle simulates
• Corrupt(C, a) If a = 1, it outputs the C's private key; If a = 2, it outputs C's extemporaneous private key. Ephemeral key reveal(W, C) The oracle simulates the key leak attack. A can get some temporary secret information of W/C by using this query. This query can be asked only once. Test(W/C) This oracle query is not used to simulate the A's attack, but to define semantic security of the session key. After querying the oracle, a value will be returned according to a predefined random bit b. If b = 1, A would get the session key shared by W and C; otherwise the A only gets a random value with same length. This query can be asked only once.
• Security goals Session identification sid is the message sets which are sent and received by W and C in the protocol. We say W/C has accepted if the session key has been successfully negotiated.
Partner (Par) Let be W ∈ Clients and C ∈ Server. We say that instances W and C are partnered if the following conditions are met: (1) 
2) SECURITY PROOF
Before starting to prove, we recall ECDLP on which the security proof relies. ECDLP Assumption: Let G be a finite cyclic group of prime order q generated by Q. Let A be a ECDLPadversary with running time at most t. Adv ECDLP G (A) denotes the probability that A succeeds in computing x from xQ by Adv ECDLP G (t) = max A {Adv ECDLP G (A)}, where the maximum is taken over all the adversaries with the running time at most t.
Theorem: Let G be a finite cyclic group and let A be an adversary against the semantic security with time bound t by less than q s sessions, q d Sendqueries, q e Executequeries, and q h Hashqueries. Then we have:
where t e demotes the exponentiation computational time in G. Proof: The main proof idea is that if A destroys semantic security of the protocol successfully, S can solve the ECDLP by A's answers. S simulates the protocol for A. Our proof defines a sequence of hybrid games, starting with the real attack and ending with a game in which A has no advantage. For each Game n , we define events Succ n as corresponding the case in which A correctly guesses the bit b involved in the Testquery. AskH n denotes A successfully computes the secret value key W C by querying h 1 • The lists of L h = (i, m, n) is empty at the beginning.
• Whenever A issues a query m, the same answer n from the list L h will be given if the request has been asked before. Otherwise, S chooses n ∈ {0, 1} l , and returns n as answer, adds this new record (i, m, n) to L h , where i is the query time, m is the content set, n is the corresponding answer set. The Execute, Reveal, Send, Corrupt, Test oracles are also simulated as real attack. Since S just makes the relevant records in Game 1 . Compared with Game 0 , it can easily see that this game is perfectly indistinguishable from the real game. Hence,
Game 2 In this game, S simulates all oracles as in Game 1 . In order to analyze the following games easily, the possible collisions are first considered. All the executions will be terminated if a collision occurs in the massage S j , where (j = 1, 2, . . . , 18). According to the birthday paradox, the collision probability in the output of h oracle is at most 14(q h ) 2 2 l+1 . Similarly, the collision probability of the messages (∈ Z * q ) is at most
Game 3 In this game, the executions are finished if A luckily guesses the authentication values S j , where (j = 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18) without the hash queries. The Game 2 has removed the collision possibility, and the guessed value of A is exactly the original value with the probability 14q d 2 l . Hence, Game 3 and Game 2 are indistinguishable, so
Game 4 In this game, the executions are halted if A has luckily guessed the pairs (SK W , r W ) or (SK C , r C ) without the hash queries, and spoofed the Clients and Server successfully. Hence, Game 4 and Game 3 are indistinguishable, therefore, 
Note: Here, we prove Pr[AskH 5 ] is restrained as follows:
It is clear that they are based on the ECDLP. 2 2 l+1 +
Thus,we get:
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this paper, the communication cost is reduced by removing the unnecessary information transmitted, while remaining high security. The computation cost is mainly discussed in the following. We compare ETAP to the [21] , [22] , [23] and [24] protocols, both of which provide cloud medical service. For convenience, we define some notations about the running time and energy cost in Table 2 and Table3 [30] - [34] , respectively. In addition, we also discuss how ETAP is efficient than others from its implementation point of view later in this section as roughly shown in Fig.7 . NOTE: We mainly focus on the efficiency of four phases on patients' side: Healthcare center upload phase, Patient upload phase, Treatment phase and Checking up phase. Since these four phases are the main body of ETAP and are executed much more frequently than the other phases.
A. COMPUTATION COST
We analyze and compare the computation cost of ETAP and related AKA protocols. Let t h , t c , t x , t bp , t sm , t sg , t sv , t ed and t hp denote hash function, concatenation operation, XOR operation, the time complexity for scarlar bilinear paring operation, multiplication operation, signature generation operation, signature verification operation, encryption/decryption operation and hash-to-point operation. Since the time of hash function, concatenation operation and XOR operation are negligible as compared to the other five operations, we do not take t h , t c and t x into account.
Based on the implementation results in [32] , we analyze and compare the computation cost of related AKA protocols, as shown in Fig7(a) .
In patients' side, Chiou et al.'s [21] protocol has to carry out two signature verification operations, four encryption/decryption operations, ten hash-to-point operations and four scarlar bilinear paring operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 2t sv + 4t ed + 10t hp + 4t bp ≈ 173.03ms. In healthcare center's side, it has to carry out one signature generation operation, two encryption/decryption operations, four hash-to-point operations and two scarlar bilinear paring operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sg + 2t ed + 4t hp + 2t bp ≈ 92.09ms. In doctors' side, it has to carry out one signature generation operation, one signature verification operation, two encryption/decryption operations, five hash-to-point operations and two scarlar bilinear paring operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sg + 1t sv + 4t ed + 5t hp + 2t bp ≈ 118.08ms.
In patients' side, Mohit et al.'s [22] protocol has to carry out one signature generation operation, two signature verification operations, four encryption/decryption operations and ten hash-to-point operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sg + 2t sv + 4t ed + 10t hp ≈ 75.27ms. In healthcare center's side, it has to carry out one signature generation operation, two encryption/decryption operations and five hashto-point operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sg + 2t ed + 5t hp ≈ 93.67ms. In doctors' side, it has to carry out one signature generation operation, one signature verification operation, two encryption/decryption operations and six hash-to-point operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sg + 1t sv + 2t ed + 6t hp ≈ 111.95ms.
In patients' side, Cheng et al.'s [23] protocol has to carry out two multiplication operations, two signature verification operations, four encryption/decryption operations, eleven hash-to-point operations and four scarlar bilinear paring operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 2t sm + 2t sv + 4t ed + 11t hp + 4t bp ≈ 189.78ms. In healthcare center's side, it has to carry out one multiplication operation, one signature generation operation, two encryption/decryption operations, three hash-to-point operations and one scarlar bilinear paring operation. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sm + 1t sg + 2t ed + 3t hp + 1t bp ≈ 76.31ms. In doctors' side, it has to carry out one multiplication operation, one signature generation operation, one signature verification operation, two encryption/decryption operations, five hash-to-point operations and two scarlar bilinear paring operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sm + 1t sg + 1t sg + 2t ed + 5t hp + 2t bp ≈ 113.43ms.
In patients' side, Li et al.'s [24] protocol has to carry out one signature generation operation, one signature verification operation, five encryption/decryption operations and ten hash-to-point operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sg + 1t sg + 5t ed + 10t hp ≈ 173.17ms. In healthcare center's side, it has to carry out has to carry out one signature generation operation, two encryption/decryption operations and five hash-to-point operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sg + 2t ed + 5t hp ≈ 93.67ms. In doctors' side, it has to carry out one signature generation operation, two signature verification operations, four encryption/decryption operations and six hash-to-point operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sg + 2t sg + 4t ed + 6t hp ≈ 125.52ms.
In patients' side, EATP has to carry out one multiplication operation, four encryption/decryption operations, three hashto-point operations and three scarlar bilinear paring operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sm + 4t ed + 3t hp + 3t bp ≈ 71.10ms. In healthcare center's side, it has to carry out one multiplication operation, two encryption/decryption operations, two hash-to-point operations and two scarlar bilinear paring operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sm + 2t ed + 2t hp + 2t bp ≈ 45.56ms. In doctors' side, it has to carry out one multiplication operation, two encryption/decryption operations, two hash-to-point operations and two scarlar bilinear paring operations. Therefore, the running time of patients is 1t sm +2t ed +2t hp +2t bp ≈ 45.56ms.
According to the above comparisons of computation cost, we know that the ETAP has much less running time than other four related AKA protocols [21] - [24] in patients' side, healthcare center's side and doctors' side.
B. COMMUNICATION COST
In this subsection, we analyze and compare the communication costs of ETAP and other four related AKA protocols [21] - [24] . Because the size of P is 512 bits, then the size of an element in G. Without loss of generality, let the sizes of an element in G, bilinear paring's value, signature value, encryption/decryption value, random number is 512 bits. The size of the length of the pseudo identity is 128 bits. The size of the general hash functions output is 160 bits. The size of current timestamp is 32 bits. The comparisons among related protocols are listed in Table 4 . [21] protocol is 9 * 512 + 7 * 512 + 2 * 512 + 7 * 128 + 4 * 32 + 2 * 512 = 11264 bits.
In ETAP, among the interactive messages, there are seven elements in G, seven encryption/decryption values, five identities, five timestamps and sixteen general hash functions outputs. Therefore, the communication cost of ETAP is 7 * 512 + 7 * 512 + 5 * 128 + 5 * 32 + 16 * 160 = 10528 bits.
According to the above comparisons of communication cost, we know that the ETAP also has much less communication cost than other four related AKA protocols [21] - [24] C. ENERGY COST In mobile devices, energy-saving is an important indicator. Here, we only discuss the patients' side from three part: energy to transmit, energy to receive and energy to operations, as shown in Fig7(b) .
From the above, in patients' side of Chiou et al.'s [21] protocol, it needs to transmit six elements in G, two encryption/decryption values, three identities and three timestamps total, 4576 bits. According to [31] and [34] , it costs 33.86 mJ. It receives two elements in G, two encryption/decryption values and two signature values, total 3072 bits, which costs 10.33 mJ. The operations are one signature generation operation, two signature verification operations, four encryption/decryption operations and ten hash-to-point operations. The energy is 797.48 mJ.
From the above, in patients' side of Mohit et al.'s [22] protocol, it needs to transmit two elements in G, two encryption/decryption values, one signature value, three identities and two timestamps, total 3008 bits, which costs 22.26 mJ. It receives two elements in G, two encryption/decryption values, two signature values and one timestamp, total 3104 bits, which costs 10.43 mJ. The operations are one signature generation operation, two signature verification operations, four encryption/decryption operations and ten hash-to-point operations. The energy is 573.98 mJ.
From the above, in patients' side of Cheng et al.'s [23] protocol, it needs to transmit eight elements in G, two encryption/decryption values, three identities and three timestamps total 5600 bits, which costs 41.44 mJ. It receives two elements in G, two encryption/decryption values and two signature value, total 3072 bits, which costs 10.33 mJ. The operations are eleven scarlar bilinear paring operations, two signature generation operations, three signature verification operations, nine encryption/decryption operations, thirty-four hash-to-point operations and four scalar multiplication operations. The energy is 759.96 mJ.
From the above, in patients' side of Li et al.'s [24] , it needs to transmit two elements in G, two encryption/decryption values, four identities and one timestamp, total 2592 bits, which costs 19.18 mJ. It receives two elements in G, two encryption/decryption values, two signature values and one timestamp, total 3104 bits, which costs 10.44 mJ. The operations are one signature generation operation, one signature verification operation, five encryption/decryption operations and ten hash-to-point operations. The energy is 372.57 mJ.
In patients' side of ETAP, it needs to transmit three elements in G, two encryption/decryption values, three identities, five general hash functions outputs and three timestamps, total 3804 bits, which costs 23.09 mJ. It receives two encryption/decryption values and four five general hash functions outputs, total 1664 bits, which costs 5.60 mJ. The operations are one multiplication operation, four encryption/decryption operations, three hash-to-point operations and three scarlar bilinear paring operations. The energy is 177.75mJ.
According to the above comparisons of energy cost, we know that the ETAP also is energy-saving compared with the other four related AKA protocols [21] - [24] .
D. SECURITY COMPARISONS
To show the security advantages of ETAP, we present security comparisons between ETAP and other four related AKA protocols [21] - [24] . The security comparisons are listed in Table 5 . From Table 5 , we can get that ETAP can satisfy all ten security and function requirements. Therefore, the ETAP is more secure than other four related AKA protocols. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND ONGIONG WORK
In this work, we first analyzed the Cheng et al.'s protocol and showed that it t it fails to provide message confidentiality and patient's anonymity. Next, we presented an enhanced protocol to address the drawbacks found in Cheng et al. ' The ETAP not only mitigates the weaknesses, but has other advantages. ETAP realizes anonymity and traceability for patients. ETAP is also proved secure against impersonation, modification, replay, internal attacks, and so on. We compare ETAP with other related existing protocols in terms of computation and communication overheads. The comparison shows that ETAP is efficient and provides versatile functions for the medical social network. The future work is to fully identify the practical threats on cloud-based authentication protocols with better performance.
